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Abstract
As they become more successful, populist radical right parties face a tension between keep-
ing their nativist credentials and moderating their appeal to gain new voters. We argue
that differentiating party messages to core supporters and the wider electorate allows par-
ties to pursue both goals. We outline and empirically illustrate the previously under-
explored phenomenon of selective messaging based on the communication strategy of
the Hungarian Jobbik party throughout its lifespan (2006–19) in partisan outlets, press
releases and Facebook. Using a dictionary approach, we map the co-evolution of populist
and nativist mobilization under conditions of supply- and demand-side changes. Our
results show the decline and transformation of Jobbik’s nativist appeal, and an increasing
reliance on populism. The trend is not uniform; Jobbik relies on nativism as a function of
targeting party identifiers or the general electorate in specific media outlets. Our findings
show the importance of mapping parties’ programmatic appeal across platforms and over
time.
Keywords: populist radical right; media; Jobbik; nativism; populism; CEE
Populist radical right (PRR) parties are one of the most researched party families in
the literature on European party competition and political conflict structures. The
burgeoning literature devotes considerable attention to the disproportionate influ-
ence of PRR parties on the programmatic offering of their competitors (e.g. Hutter
and Kriesi 2021), hardly explained by the moderate electoral success which mem-
bers of this party family typically achieve. Yet, despite the focus on the mainstream-
ing of PRR appeal by other parties, we know less about the trade-offs involved in
the mainstreaming of PRR parties themselves as they transform over their life cycle
(Akkerman et al. 2016). This is important since understanding change in the pro-
grammatic appeal of PRR parties determines the extent to which they become less
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited. This
is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.

































































































































of a pariah party over time. Here, the dynamic of competition in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) reveals more pronounced changes over time than in the
more institutionalized Western European party systems (Pytlas 2019).
We focus on the role of the media which allows these parties to face the trade-
offs involved in broadening their appeal beyond their core constituency. PRR par-
ties compete in an increasingly differentiated media environment, where online
media outlets and particularly social media is growing in importance for the
media diet of the citizenry. Communication research has explored the extent to
which a transformed media environment and specific types of media outlets may
carry or even reinforce populism and nativism (e.g. Engesser et al. 2017;
Hameleers and Vliegenthart 2019; Krämer 2017; Zulianello et al. 2018) as the
two key elements of the programmatic appeal of PRR parties. However, this line
of literature has largely existed separately from the literature on party competition,
which discusses the incentives to change party appeal.
We propose bridging the literature on party competition and political commu-
nication to explore change over time in the programmatic appeal of a PRR party
throughout its life cycle: Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik
Magyarországért Mozgalom). We take Jobbik as a representative case of the PRR
party family in the post-communist region, an ‘archetype of the populist radical
right party in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Pirro 2015: 106). Although initially
Jobbik achieved early and exceptional success by regional standards through a
nativist appeal, the party adopted a more mainstream programme soon after its
entry to parliament in 2010 in the hope of increasing its electoral support.
However, the success of this strategy remained limited and after the third Fidesz
two-thirds electoral victory, its long-term president, Gábor Vona (2006–18)
resigned in the aftermath of the 2018 elections. Since then, Jobbik has seen the
rise of intra-party conflict and a decline in both its electoral support and its visibil-
ity in the press.1 Studying Jobbik in this period thus allows us to trace the party’s
programmatic appeal over its lifetime. The case of Jobbik illustrates the specific
issues the transformation of PRR parties entails in the CEE context.
Although programmatic change is generally a risk for parties, it comes with par-
ticular challenges for PRR parties. They combine people-centred, anti-establishment
rhetoric with nativism to maintain their reputation of uncompromising ideological
purity (Akkerman et al. 2016). Yet, as they are confronted with isolation in the
party system and reach the electoral ceiling of PRR rhetoric, it becomes appealing
to adjust their message and bring it closer to the preferences of the median voter.
While targeting the centre is potentially attractive to all parties in a Downsian frame-
work (Wagner 2012), the moderation of PRR parties hinges on nativism: unlike
mainstream parties that form their appeal based on a diverse set of issues without
particular emphasis on any single one of them, for PRR parties, nativist issues play
a key role. De-emphasizing nativism carries the risk of losing the support of their
core electorate, but may allow PRR parties to achieve higher vote shares overall
and eschew the stigma of a pariah party.
In previous research, change in PRR programmatic appeal is conceptualized as
positional shifts across issue dimensions (Wagner and Meyer 2017), an expansion
of the diversity of issues emphasized in party platforms (Bergman and Flatt 2020)
or a shift in narrative frames (Pytlas 2019). Notwithstanding their merit, none of
































































































































these approaches considers the distinction between populism and nativism import-
ant in explaining shifts in the appeal of PRR parties over time, mostly because they
implicitly assume that emphasis on populist and nativist messages is part of the
same dimension and the two ‘move together’. The argument is most explicitly
formulated by Tjitske Akkerman et al. (2016), who identify the moderation of
PRR parties’ nativist and populist appeal as two distinct but equally important
dimensions of mainstreaming. We propose a previously underexplored mechanism,
according to which the mainstreaming of the appeal of the PRR is captured by a
shift in emphasis from nativism towards populism. Increasing the salience of popu-
lism to the detriment of nativism should help PRR parties to develop a more ‘mod-
erate’ profile without abandoning their core electorate. In this regard, we contest the
assumption that by mainstreaming their appeal, PRR parties equally abandon
populist and nativist appeals. The empirical analysis of Jobbik’s communication
in partisan media outlets, press releases and Facebook posts illustrates that nativism
simultaneously declines and transforms, allowing populism to become the defining
element of the party’s programmatic appeal.
Our approach innovates both substantively and methodologically. By bridging the
party competition and political communication literature, we bring the focus on PRR
parties and CEE party competition to the literature on political communication. We
enrich the literature on party competition with the focus on media strategies and
outlet-level differences in parties’ programmatic appeal. Methodologically, we study
this dynamic through an exceptionally long time span, from 2006 to 2019, and across
different sources. To study Jobbik’s appeal over time, we collected a unique data set
that brings together partisan sources, press releases and Facebook posts. To our
knowledge, no other analysis of the communication strategy of a PRR party to
date covers a similarly long time span across a set of sources as diverse as these.
We innovate on the prevalent approach in the literature, which infers party positions
based on a single source, be that expert surveys or party manifestos. Using a diction-
ary approach to party messages, we put the agency of PRR parties at the centre of the
analysis and discuss the constraints and opportunities provided by the media envir-
onment and electoral competition.
In what follows, we outline the role of the media in alleviating the tension PRR
parties face as they become more successful and have to appeal to a diverse set of
preferences. After introducing the type of data we analyse and our dictionary-based
approach to studying the development of populist and nativist appeals, we present
empirical evidence of static and over time differences between media channels, as
well as the role of supply- and demand-side factors in the evolution of Jobbik’s pro-
grammatic appeal. The conclusion summarizes the findings and places them in the
broader literature on PRR parties.
Theoretical considerations
Two models of challenger politics in CEE
We start by introducing the distinction between what we consider the two prevalent
models of challenger party politics in the CEE region (Engler et al. 2019; Kriesi 2014;
Stanley 2017; Učeň 2007). The first of these models is nativist mobilization by PRR
parties, the second anti-establishment mobilization by centrist populist parties.
































































































































According to Cas Mudde (2007: 15–23), PRR parties are defined by their nativist
appeal. These parties combine nativism with populism and authoritarianism, the
two additional dimensions that characterize the appeal of the PRR party family.2
Nativism, as the ideology of the nation state, ‘holds that states should be inhabited
exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native ele-
ments (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state’ (Mudde 2007: 19). In formulating a nativist appeal, PRR parties expli-
citly exclude groups that they consider non-native. Although both nativism and
populism are often mobilized by the same PRR actors, populism is a thin-centred
ideology (for the analytical distinction between the two, see e.g. Bonikowski 2017),
defined by the interaction of two distinct components: people-centrism and anti-
elitism (Mudde 2004). People-centrism, an appeal to the ‘will of the people’, is
an often-used trope in a range of programmatically different calls to mobilize.
Here ‘people’ ‘can refer to the common or ordinary people, the people as plebs;
to the sovereign people, the people as demos; and to the culturally or ethnically dis-
tinct people, the people as nation or ethnos’ (Brubaker 2017: 359). While nativism
and populism might both appeal to the ‘people’, nativism entails a more restrictive
ethnic definition of the people. Unlike nativism, populist mobilization formulates
an encompassing message, without targeting or excluding groups based on pre-
political traits. Additionally, populism links people-centrism with anti-elitism by
accusing elites of betraying the will of the people.
While PRR parties achieved notable success after the transition by combining
nativist and populist mobilization, after EU accession a particular brand of populist
mobilization emerged in the CEE region (Kriesi 2014; Stanley 2017) – so-called
centrist populism (Engler et al. 2019). Centrist populist parties mobilize against
the political elite as a whole, formulating an anti-elitist, pure form of populism,
‘almost completely unencumbered by ideological constraints’ (Učeň 2007: 54).
Whereas, in the case of PRR parties, nativism acts as a host ideology and forms
a well-identifiable core of their programmatic appeal, the host ideology of centrist
populist parties varies considerably (Engler et al. 2019). The success of centrist
populist parties in CEE demonstrates the ability of these parties to make salient
use of anti-establishment/populist ‘thin’ supply even if they link it with ‘thick’ ideo-
logical appeals placed within the mainstream. PRR parties that have achieved a cer-
tain level of success but are confronted with the limited availability of new voters
sympathetic to their nativist agenda might be inspired by the success of this alter-
native brand. One strategy to outgrow the limits of a nativist appeal is to change the
‘thick’ ideology of nativism while keeping the ‘thin’ populist elements of people-
centric and anti-establishment mobilization intact. Such a strategy runs counter
to the assumption that populism and nativism need to develop similarly in pro-
cesses of moderation (e.g. Akkerman et al. 2016).
Differentiated media landscape and strategic messaging
So far, we have introduced the distinction between the two models of challenger
politics in the CEE region and indicated why centrist populism might appeal to
already established PRR parties. In this section, we discuss the role of the media
in allowing the party to rebrand its nativist ‘thick’ ideology and target more centrist
































































































































voters. We build on literature that discusses how parties communicate with voters
in CEE in their attempt to augment and stabilize their electorate, a literature which
has explored two different avenues. First, an increasing body of work demonstrates
that parties use their organizations to communicate with voters (e.g. Tavits 2013).
Second, when they communicate via media channels, parties mobilize the appeal of
their candidates and organizational brand (Pirro 2015; Werkmann and Gherghina
2018). We take a step further and explain the mechanisms that lead to higher and
more differentiated electoral appeals in the case of communication via the media by
a PRR party.
Specifically, we argue that the segmentation between the audience of the differ-
ent media outlets means that parties may formulate two different appeals simultan-
eously: one targeted at their core electorate, and the other at the general public. This
is in line with existing qualitative evidence suggesting that parties act strategically
and consider differences in the audience of platforms in their online campaigns
(e.g. Kreiss et al. 2018). For PRR parties, a differentiated media landscape provides
the opportunity to target audiences selectively, and simultaneously deploy nativist
messages for their base while formulating an appeal to new voters with a less nativ-
ist appeal.
To understand how PRR parties build their appeal strategically, we need to
enrich the purely ideational understanding of populism with the role of populist
communication strategies. While the two are sometimes discussed as competing
approaches to the study of populism, we consider them complementary and follow
Hanspeter Kriesi (2014: 364; also see Jagers and Walgrave 2007), who argues that
‘populist ideology manifests itself in the political communication strategies of
populist leaders. … As an expression of the populist ideology, populist communi-
cation strategies may be used to identify the populist ideology empirically.’
This leads us to adapt the argument about parties’ strategic communication across
media channels so that it emphasizes both aspects of the PRR appeal: PRR parties
may weight the thin ideology of populism and the thick ideology of nativism differ-
ently in their communication on different platforms. This can be translated directly
into our first expectation: the key dimension distinguishing media outlets is how far
they target core supporters as opposed to the general electorate. We argue that PRR
parties attempting to moderate their programmatic appeal – here Jobbik – rely on
more partisan media outlets to keep their supporters on board with nativist messages.
Having a firmly established presence in the relatively isolated radical right milieu
allows the party also to formulate a more inclusive, populist message for the general
electorate in the mainstream media. Hence, our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The more a media channel targets the party’s core supporters, the
more nativist the party’s communication on this channel.
In addition to static differences, our argument about media strategies as an expres-
sion of moderation entails that the shift over time is not characterized by the same
trend and pace across platforms. Two different processes contribute: on the one
hand, to maintain their credibility, we expect mainstreaming by PRR parties to
be a gradual and continuous process that takes place over a longer time. On the
other hand, maintaining the loyalty of existing voters requires regularly deploying
































































































































nativist messages – for instance, to fire up the base before elections. This strategy
should result in short-term fluctuations in the emphasis on these messages.
While both the long-term trend and the fluctuation shape the level of nativism,
we argue that we are most likely to observe bursts of nativist messages on platforms
targeting existing supporters – for example, in partisan media outlets. In contrast,
in outward communication that Jobbik engages in to change its appeal, we are more
likely to see gradual and continuous change.
Hypothesis 2: The more a media channel targets the party’s core supporters, the
more the dynamic of nativism fluctuates.
PRR parties’ appeal in their electoral context
In the previous sections, we introduced the two models of challenger politics in
CEE as well as the role of a differentiated media landscape in allowing PRR parties
to balance the two forms of appeal. In this section we will discuss the broader con-
text of electoral competition to identify the incentives PRR parties face in forming
and adjusting their appeal. We argue that the extent to which PRR parties maintain
their nativist appeal depends on the interaction of media channels with supply- and
demand-side considerations.
According to our baseline expectation, as they mature, PRR parties moderate
their nativist appeal throughout their lifetime. A key moment in this regard is
entry to parliament, when the institutional logic of parliamentary politics puts
these parties under pressure both to take a position on a broader set of issues
and to break with movement-based mobilization (Kitschelt 2006: 287). Although
most successful PRR parties broaden their appeal beyond nativism (Bergman and
Flatt 2020), we suggest the dynamic of the process is not only a function of their
organizational features but depends on the broader context of electoral competition
(Kitschelt 1989), including both supply- and demand-side factors.
We highlight two such factors that we argue shape PRR parties’ media strategies.
First, potential supply-side competition from another party targeting nativist voters
with a programmatically proximate offer may push PRR parties to stop moderating.
PRR parties are then forced to re-emphasize nativism and distinguish themselves
from their competitor. This may occur because of the emergence of radical splinter
parties or because centre-right parties appease the radical electorate. Here, Hungary
represents an extreme case: although not having a cordon sanitaire between the
mainstream and the PRR is somewhat typical for CEE (e.g. Pytlas 2019), the
main centre-right party in Hungary, Fidesz, increasingly targeted nativist voters
after the 2015 so-called migration crisis (Gessler et al. 2021). Notably, by 2017,
Fidesz overtook Jobbik in being the party furthest to the right in the Hungarian
party system in cultural terms (Pirro et al. 2019: 3). Fidesz’s move was part of a
longer-term strategy of accommodating some of Jobbik’s proposals (Enyedi and
Róna 2018; Gessler and Kyriazi 2019; Pirro 2015; Pytlas 2016), which put Jobbik
under pressure to distinguish its stance from the rhetoric of the government and
defend its electoral base. In this regard, being embedded in the radical right
media landscape might allow Jobbik to appeal differently to its core electorate to
renew its nativist reputation. Accordingly, we expect that:
































































































































Hypothesis 3: As Fidesz becomes more nativist, Jobbik increases the salience of
nativism in media channels targeting the party’s core supporters.
Second, from a demand-side perspective, the appeal of PRR parties should also
depend on the potential to gain new voters. With their populist appeal, PRR parties
are in principle well-positioned to target voters disappointed with other parties and
political elites. Distancing themselves from nativism means they can not only target
right-wing but all anti-establishment voters. Here, the high level of ideological
polarization (Vegetti 2019) and dissatisfaction with the government in Hungary
should sustain this dynamic; public opinion polls consistently find that more voters
wants a change in government than those willing to vote for the parties in oppos-
ition. This constitutes a central anti-/pro-government divide and provides particu-
lar opportunities for Jobbik, as it refused to cooperate with former governing parties
of both political camps. Not being associated with past governments potentially
allows Jobbik to mobilize not only voters disappointed with the government but
also those who did not vote in the past.3 As we argued previously, a central strategy
in this regard is to form a broad appeal in general media outlets. Consequently, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4A: When the share of undecided voters is higher, Jobbik decreases the
salience of nativism in media channels targeting the general electorate.
However, as Markus Wagner (2012) convincingly argues, parties evaluate demand-
side opportunities differently, depending on the parties’ strength in the electorate.
For large parties, moderate positions enable them to appeal to a wide electorate. For
smaller parties such as the PRR, emphasizing issues on which they have extreme
positions allows them to distinguish their profile (also see Kitschelt 1994). While
Wagner does not include the media in his model of issue selection, a segmented
media market allows parties to differentiate their appeal further. Thereby, parties
can distinguish themselves among their supporters without necessarily alienating
undecided voters. Introducing differences across media channels leads us to expect
that when Jobbik is smaller, the party emphasizes nativist issues in outlets targeting
its core electorate. In contrast, when Jobbik is more popular, we would expect a
lesser emphasis on nativism across all media channels:
Hypothesis 4B: When the share of undecided voters is higher and Jobbik is less
popular, the party is more likely to rely on its nativist message in media channels tar-
geting its core electorate, but not in media channels targeting the general electorate.
The implications of the supply- and demand-side dynamic give rise to competing
pressures on PRR media strategies. While Fidesz targeted its core electorate, Jobbik
faced an increasing pressure to present a more inclusive, anti-Fidesz appeal. Faced
with these countervailing forces, we argue that a differentiated media landscape
allows PRR parties to ‘square the circle’ by tailoring their appeal to both partisan
and centrist voters. In what follows we describe the media context which makes
such a strategy viable in the Hungarian case.
































































































































The PRR in the Hungarian media landscape
Compared with other CEE countries, the Hungarian media landscape is considered
remarkably clientelistic (Örnebring 2012). High political dependency allowed both
the left and right to establish their own media empire, for example, by dividing up
available radio licences among stations loyal to them. The new media law adopted
in 2010, and the restructuring of ownership in its aftermath, increased the political
dependence of the media (Bajomi-Lázár 2015) and led to the dominance of
right-wing media outlets. In this context, the radical right has established its own
media environment independent of mainstream media outlets (Jeskó et al. 2012).
The radical right media is embedded in a subcultural milieu where, next to political
and infotainment media outlets, other actors are present, such as national rock
bands, clothing shops and even organic food shops. To conceptualize the extent
of differentiation of the radical right media network, József Jeskó et al. (2012)
cite the pillarized society model of Arend Lijphart (1968). Relying on their analysis,
we map the programmatic appeal of Jobbik in the two most prominent partisan
media outlets.
Based on network analysis, Jeskó et al. (2012) find an isolated, self-referential
radical right online network, with most websites established after 2006. They iden-
tify infotainment websites as key instruments for Jobbik to feed its messages to its
supporters. Two of these websites stand out in their analysis as the source of the
messages that subsequently spread in the network: Kuruc.info and Barikád.hu.
Launched in 2006, Kuruc.info has been the most prominent source of hate speech
in Hungary. The page features sections devoted to so-called ‘Holocaust fakes’,
‘Roma criminality’, ‘anti-Hungarianism’ and ‘politician criminality’. Kuruc.info
enjoys remarkable popularity: in 2010, it was the third-largest online political
news source with around 60–90,000 unique visitors per day. Although Jobbik did
not acknowledge its links to the website, the portal has been one of the most
devoted allies of the party due to its affiliation with Előd Novák, a politician in
Jobbik’s leadership.4 Thus, we decided to include this source, in part due to its
prominence in the radical right online network, in part due to the overlap between
its readership and the party’s core electorate.
Unlike Kuruc.info, which has an independent identity and loyal supporters, the
second website Jeskó et al. (2012) identify, Barikád.hu, was established as a party
news website. Published as a weekly magazine in print between 2010 and 2017,
in addition to daily online coverage, it is primarily financed by the party foundation
of Jobbik. When the distance between Kuruc.info and Jobbik started to increase,
Barikád.hu went through a change as well: pre-2012 posts were deleted, and the
platform was rebranded as Alfahír.hu. The website has become a right-wing
news site, aiming to provide a consistent flow of information to party supporters
but falling short of the radicalism as well as the popularity of Kuruc.info. Its
news sections and editorials feature Jobbik prominently in a positive light. Given
the close connection between Alfahír.hu and the leadership of Jobbik, the party
has considerable influence over what is published on this platform.
While Jobbik is only partly able to influence what is published by these sources,
both Kuruc.info and Alfahír.hu represent the media channels most clearly targeting
the party’s core supporters. In addition to them, we also trace the programmatic
































































































































appeal of Jobbik in the party’s press releases and on Facebook. While in the press
releases Jobbik targets the general electorate via the press, the target audience of
social media posts is less clear. On the one hand, we may suspect that Facebook
serves as a medium of direct communication (Engesser et al. 2017; Krämer
2017) between the party and its relatively young voter base. On the other hand,
given the diversity of potential audiences on social media – not only sympathizers
but also journalists and other media professionals – Facebook might also be a tool
for the party to inform a broader audience. In the latter case, Facebook serves the
same purpose as the press releases issued by Jobbik and distributed by traditional
media outlets: it broadcasts the party’s message to the general public.
Data and methods
We propose studying programmatic change as a shift in emphasis. More specific-
ally, we study changes in the salience (i.e. relative emphasis) of the elements asso-
ciated with the populist and nativist ideology in Jobbik’s messages in different
media outlets over time. While studying programmatic change based on salience
neglects positional shifts, the latter are relatively unlikely to occur, especially in
the case of radical parties (Hooghe and Marks 2018).
Techniques of quantitative text analysis have two advantages vis-à-vis other
approaches in measuring populist and nativist communication, both of which
have key importance in our research design (Meijers and Zaslove 2021). First,
they are uniquely able to capture shifts in salience. Secondly, they allow us to esti-
mate the variance between different texts, and consequently between different
media outlets. Our approach builds on recent papers that use quantitative text ana-
lysis to measure issue emphasis and specifically populism with dictionaries
(Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, 2019; Hameleers and Vliegenthart 2019; Harrison
and Bruter 2011; Hunger 2020; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011).
However, we go beyond existing work by, first, carefully constructing a comprehen-
sive populism dictionary that is specific to the Hungarian context, second, by
assembling a much larger text corpus that includes multiple sources and covers
the party throughout its life.
We construct dictionaries to trace the three key concepts of our analysis: anti-
elitism, people-centrism and nativism. In line with the definition of populism
(see above), and with the recent literature on populism as a latent construct (e.g.
Meijers and Zaslove 2021), we classify a document as populist when terms from
both the anti-elitist and the people-centrist dictionary are present. We start the dic-
tionary construction by translating the terms used in the dictionaries of the above-
cited studies. We tested them by sampling texts that contained the terms. We kept
only entries that were present in at least two of the corpora we examine and indeed
appeared in a context associated with the concept they aim to measure. We com-
plemented these terms with two additional sources. First, we constructed a list of
terms based on the Manifesto Corpus (Merz et al. 2016): we selected all electoral
manifestos by Jobbik and extracted the terms that distinguish issues close to our
key concepts from other issues.5 Second, we complemented the final list with
some context-specific terms, mostly referring to historical revisionism, which
were not present in the previous lists or the manifestos. To validate our dictionary,
































































































































we tested its performance against a stratified sample of 250 hand-coded documents,
randomly selected from all five corpora. The dictionary is slightly better for nativ-
ism (F score = 0.91) than for populism (F score = 0.82). Online Appendix A pre-
sents the final terms and additional details on the dictionary we constructed.
To convert these documents into measures of emphasis on populism and nativ-
ism, we follow the approach of Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron (2016, 2019),
and rely on a dichotomous distinction in classifying them: a document is nativist
if it includes at least one word from our nativism dictionary, a document is populist
if it includes at least one word each from our anti-elitism and our people-centrism
dictionary.6 While less precise than a relative approach that measures the propor-
tion of nativist words within a document, we believe the dichotomous distinction
provides a more accurate assessment of the overall corpus, since it mitigates differ-
ences in the length and character of documents which we describe in the next para-
graph. Although not every document that contains, for example, one of the terms
associated with nativism may strictly be a ‘nativist document’, we believe that even
occasional nativist references activate nativist ideology. In Online Appendix D we
show the distribution of documents using an alternative, proportional measure.
For the actual analysis, we collected almost 60,000 documents that reflect
Jobbik’s communication. We obtained all articles on Kuruc.info and Alfahír.hu
which mention Jobbik in the title or main text at least once. We collected all
press releases the party had issued from the Hungarian national press service
(Országos Sajtószolgálat), which publishes press releases by parties and organiza-
tions. In addition, we also collected all Facebook posts by the official account of
the party (JobbikMagyarorszagertMozgalom) and the account of the party presi-
dent Gábor Vona (vonagabor) from CrowdTangle.7 We selected the period from
1 February 2006, the time when the first press releases by Jobbik were issued
and just before the party’s first electoral run, up until 15 March 2019. Next to
the Jobbik-specific corpora, we also collected Fidesz press releases from the same
source for the same period, to test our hypothesis on supply-side dynamics. The
five corpora differ in their time period,8 size and characteristics (e.g. average length
of documents) ranging from roughly 3,500 posts on the Facebook page of Gábor
Vona to almost 22,000 articles on Kuruc.info (see Table 1 in Online Appendix
B). We believe this represents the most comprehensive analysis of Jobbik’s commu-
nication so far.
Finally, we use the measures to conduct a time series cross-sectional regression
analysis to explore the drivers of change. In this part of the analysis, we model the
quarterly share of documents we classify as nativist. The linear model includes
panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995), and assumes a panel-specific
first order auto-correlation AR(1) process, which corresponds to the lag structure of
the nativism series on each platform. We include platform fixed effects and model
nativism as a function of Jobbik’s populism, organizational development (pre-
parliament, in-parliament, after the migration crisis), the party’s popularity
(mean value of the figures from Ipsos, Medián, Publicus, Republikon, Tárki), the
share of those in the electorate who indicate they have no party to vote for
(mean values from Tárki and Závecz Research Center), and Fidesz’s nativism
based on the party’s press releases. Jobbik’s popularity, the share of undecided
voters, and Fidesz’s nativism are included with a lag.

































































































































Our key argument refers to the variation in the amount of nativist and populist
messages across platforms. To test this expectation, we start by examining the
level of nativism and populism based on our document classification. Figure 1 pre-
sents the average share of nativism and populism by platform:
As Figure 1 shows, the level of nativism is higher than the level of populism in all
the five channels we examine, but platforms vary according to their targeting of
Jobbik’s core supporters. In line with H1, Jobbik is most likely to rely on its nativist
appeal in the two partisan media outlets, primarily on Kuruc.info, which is somewhat
more nativist than the party-funded Alfahír.hu, which in turn resembles the press
releases. Facebook substantially lags behind. Populism follows the variation of nativism:
it reaches its highest level in the partisan media outlets, followed by the press releases,
and finally by Facebook. The low levels of nativism and populism on Facebook indicate
that the party uses the social media platform to reach out to a diverse audience, which
is not necessarily attracted by nativist and/or populist messages. Overall, the gap
between the level of nativism and populism is smallest on Alfahír.hu.
We now turn to variation over time to test our second hypothesis. To do so,
Figure 2 presents the share of documents we classify as nativist or populist, across
the different platforms, over time.
Figure 1. Documents with a Nativist and Populist Appeal on Each Platform
































































































































In line with H2, the two partisan media outlets and the two Facebook pages
show the fluctuation of nativism and the more stable level of populism. As the
coverage of Kuruc.info reveals, the extent to which Jobbik relied on nativism
declined prior to entering parliament, with some shorter-term fluctuations
throughout the period. Although the coverage of Alfahír.hu starts later, the pattern
reveals similar short-term fluctuations of nativism, with populism less prone to
Figure 2. The Share of Documents Over Time with a Populist or Nativist Appeal on the Different
Platforms
Note: The lines represent the LOESS smoothed estimates for all documents within a corpus and its associated 95%
confidence interval. The dashed vertical reference lines represent national parliamentary elections.
































































































































change. This also shows that the overall level of nativism on the different platforms
varies in part due to their age. On Facebook we observe more fluctuation in nativ-
ism on the account of Vona than on the official account of the party. Press releases
follow a different dynamic, characterized by a gradual decline in nativist and popu-
list mobilization followed by relative stability after parliamentary entry.
The level of nativist mobilization only partially follows the electoral calendar.
Before the 2014 elections, Jobbik toned down its nativist appeal as part of a cam-
paign to appear more moderate associated with the leadership of Vona that became
known as the ‘cuteness campaign’. In contrast, before the 2018 election, Jobbik
(re-)mobilized its nativist appeal on Alfahír.hu and Facebook, but the pre-election
rise in nativism remains more modest than the relative peak of nativist mobilization
in the pre-2010 period before Jobbik entered parliament. In parliament, the peak of
nativist mobilization corresponds to the so-called migration crisis in the second half
of 2015. This was the period during which Fidesz took a nativist turn. Figure 3
shows Jobbik’s nativism across platforms parallel with the level of nativism
observed in Fidesz’s press releases during the same period.
As the figure shows, during this time, Jobbik’s nativism radically increases across
virtually all platforms. However, the phenomenon was short-lived, and by the
second half of 2016 populism and nativism became similarly important on all plat-
forms except Kuruc.info. While we are not suggesting that Jobbik mobilized in
nativist terms only for strategic reasons in response to Fidesz, the temporal overlap
between the two suggests supply-side interactions at least during this brief period.9
When looking at the overall period of the evolution of Jobbik’s appeal, we take the
difference in the dynamic of nativism between the partisan outlets and Facebook on
the one hand, and the press releases on the other hand as evidence of H2.
These results show that the main change in Jobbik’s programmatic profile is a
decrease in nativism over time. To model the drivers of this change, we now
turn to the regression analysis. Table 1 shows the results of the model we intro-
duced in the data and methods section.
Model 1 presents our baseline model. The model confirms the platform differ-
ences the descriptive analysis has shown: compared with the press releases, the level
of nativism in the partisan media outlets is higher, while on Facebook it is lower.
We take this as evidence of H1. The model also confirms our baseline expectation:
throughout its life cycle, but particularly after the party enters parliament, the level
of nativism in Jobbik’s appeal declines. Controlling for these factors, the model
shows that contrary to the assumption of some of the previous literature (e.g.
Akkerman et al. 2016), there is no statistically significant relationship between
the level of populism and nativism in Jobbik’s appeal. In other words, the variation
of populism does not predict the variation of nativism; the party distinguishes the
two in its messages. In terms of supply and demand, the baseline model shows that
Jobbik’s nativism does not linearly follow Fidesz’s nativism, the party’s popularity
or the proportion of undecided voters in the electorate.
However, the baseline model estimates average effects across all platforms. To
test H3, H4A and H4B, we conduct further analysis on platform-specific, differen-
tial reactions to supply- and demand-side incentives. Model 2 estimates the inter-
action effect between Fidesz’s nativism and the platform. Although, as the model
shows, Jobbik appears to be more likely to react to Fidesz’s nativism on the party’s
































































































































official Facebook page than in the press releases, the size of the effect is too small to
draw substantive conclusions (see the marginal effects in Online Appendix B,
Figure 1). Fidesz’s nativism escalates in the aftermath of the migration crisis, but
as Figures 2 and 3 have already shown, Jobbik only responds with nativist mobil-
ization for a brief period and soon returns to the previous mixture of nativist
and populist messages. As a result, we are not able to confirm our supply-side
hypothesis H3 unequivocally.
Figure 3. Over Time Share of Documents with a Nativist Appeal on the Different Platforms Compared
with the Share of Nativism in Fidesz’s Press Releases
Note: The lines represent the LOESS smoothed estimates for all documents within a corpus and its associated 95%
confidence interval. The dashed vertical reference lines represent national parliamentary elections.
































































































































Table 1. Level of Nativism in Jobbik’s Appeal (quarterly level, TSCS regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Data source (ref: press releases):
Kuruc.info 0.15*** 0.14*** -0.06 -1.14***
(10.88) (8.72) (-0.98) (-6.43)
Alfahír.hu 0.05** 0.03 -0.26** -2.22**
(2.91) (1.19) (-3.07) (-3.21)
FB – Jobbik page -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.25** -1.48***
(-8.28) (-8.38) (-3.09) (-4.20)
FB – Vona page -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.58*** -2.66***
(-5.99) (-5.73) (-5.38) (-6.46)
Jobbik’s populism 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.21
(1.74) (1.54) (1.58) (1.71)
Jobbik’s org. development
(ref: pre-parliament)
In parliament (> 2010q2 & < 2015q3) -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.08
(-3.50) (-3.39) (-3.68) (-1.71)
Migration crisis (> 2015q3) -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.05
(-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.92) (-0.76)
Jobbik’s popularity (lag) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14***
(-1.70) (-1.72) (-1.53) (-3.88)
Proportion of undecided voters (lag) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.03***
(0.43) (0.45) (-1.63) (-3.64)
Fidesz’s nativism (lag) -0.13 -0.26* -0.13 -0.12
(-1.09) (-1.97) (-1.03) (-0.99)
Kuruc.info * L.Fidesz’s nativism 0.06
(1.19)
Alfahir.hu * L.Fidesz’s nativism 0.13
(1.44)
FB – Jobbik page * L.Fidesz’s nativism 0.26***
(3.69)
FB – Vona page * L.Fidesz’s nativism 0.20
(1.79)
Kuruc.info * L.undecided_prop 0.01*** 0.03***
(3.79) (7.22)
Alfahir.hu * L.undecided_prop 0.01*** 0.05**
(3.75) (3.03)
(Continued )
































































































































To test the demand-side effects, Model 3 and Model 4 present our estimates of
variation in Jobbik’s reaction to undecided voters as a function of the media chan-
nel and as a function of the party’s popularity. In line with H4A, Model 3 shows
that the level of nativism on the partisan media outlets and Vona’s Facebook
page is higher than in the press releases when the share of undecided voters
increases. However, the effect size is once again too small to draw substantive con-
clusions (see Online Appendix B, Figure 2), possibly because the relationship is also
Table 1. (Continued.)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
FB – Jobbik page * L.undecided_prop 0.00 0.02**
(1.25) (2.77)
FB – Vona page * L.undecided_prop 0.01*** 0.05***
(4.28) (5.23)
L.Jobbik’s popularity * L.undecided_prop 0.00**
(3.24)
Kuruc.info * L.Jobbik’s popularity 0.12***
(6.55)
Alfahir.hu * L.Jobbik’s popularity 0.20**
(2.98)
FB – Jobbik page * L.Jobbik’s popularity 0.12***
(3.52)
FB – Vona page * L.Jobbik’s popularity 0.21***
(5.03)
















Observations 193 193 193 193
r2 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.82
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
































































































































moderated by the popularity of the party. We test H4B with a three-way interaction
between the party’s popularity, media channels and the share of undecided voters.
As Model 4 shows, the interaction is statistically significant. To ease its interpret-
ation, Figure 4 presents the corresponding marginal effects plots with values esti-
mated for a popularity level of 5, respectively 12% (the variable ranges from
0.22–15.16%), across the range of undecided voters in this period:
Figure 4. Marginal Effects: Jobbik’s Nativism on the Different Platforms as a Function of the Share of
Undecided Voters and the Party’s Popularity
Note: The marginal effects figure is estimated based on the three-way interaction shown in Model 4 in Table 1.
































































































































In line with our hypothesis, the results show that Jobbik is more likely to adjust
its level of nativism in response to the share of undecided voters when the party is
smaller. Once the party’s popularity reaches a certain threshold, the level of nativ-
ism becomes independent of the share of undecided voters. If the share of
undecided voters increases while Jobbik is less popular, the party is not only
more likely to rely on nativism on Alfahír.hu, and Vona’s Facebook page, but
also radically decreases nativism in the press releases to appeal to the general elect-
orate. The gap independent of Jobbik’s popularity is actually largest for the press
releases, suggesting that moderation in response to undecided voters mostly hap-
pens when communicating with the wider public. On Kuruc.info and the party’s
Facebook page, the dynamic of nativism appears to be independent of undecided
voters even when the party is small. Overall, we take this as evidence of H4B.
Conclusion
In this article, we examined programmatic change throughout the lifetime of Jobbik,
one of the archetypical examples of a PRR party in CEE. As we discussed our results
along with the development of the Hungarian party system over the past years, read-
ers may have noted that the case study design limits our conclusions to the
Hungarian context. The Hungarian context and the case of Jobbik allowed us to
map the media strategy of a PRR that achieved its breakthrough earlier than similar
parties in many other countries. Due to the formal and informal characteristics of the
institutional setting (namely a strongly majoritarian electoral system and a dominant
party shifting to the radical right), Jobbik confronted the dilemma of mainstreaming
its appeal in starker terms than perhaps other PRR parties have to face. While this
context allowed us to highlight a previously underexplored mechanism of the PRR
differentiating its appeal, we believe the phenomenon is similar in other contexts.
In fact, the rise of alt-right media networks in contexts as diverse as the US,
Germany and Slovakia points to dynamics similar to the one we have documented.
Despite the limitations of studying the dynamic in a single case, we believe our
article contributes to two strands of literatures: political communication and party
competition. We believe our article makes at least two key contributions. First, we
highlight the importance of platform differences for the literature on party compe-
tition. Namely, they allow PRR parties to navigate between the two models of chal-
lenger politics in CEE. Our results show that, having the opportunity to differentiate
its message, Jobbik appeals to the nativism of their core supporters as well as to the
populist demand among the general electorate. Contrary to previous studies, which
conceptualize mainstreaming as entailing a decline of both nativism and populism as
two complementary facets of the appeal of PRR parties (Akkerman et al. 2016), our
results show that mainstreaming is not a uniform process, but contingent on which
groups the different platforms target. The ability to rely selectively on nativist mobil-
ization allows Jobbik to call on its core supporters, even as it moderates its nativist
appeal in messages formulated for the general electorate.
Second, we outline to which factors Jobbik’s differentiated emphasis on nativism
responds. We highlight the role of demand and supply factors that have been less
present in the literature on political communication. Our results show that despite
the tremendous supply-side pressure due to the nativist turn of Fidesz, Jobbik only
































































































































briefly mobilized in nativist terms in the aftermath of the migration crisis. We
believe nativist mobilization in this period remained short-lived because, following
the majoritarian incentives in the Hungarian party system, Jobbik needed to find
coalition partners to compete against Fidesz. Nativism undermines its coalition
potential, and maintains its status as a pariah party, whereas a shift towards centrist
populism makes the party more acceptable as a partner. Generally, Jobbik appears
more responsive to demand-side opportunities such as the share of undecided
voters, especially in times when the party is not electorally popular. We also
show that Jobbik is more likely to target undecided voters in non-nativist terms
on those platforms where the party formulates an appeal to the general electorate.
Our analysis shows that even prototypical PRR parties, such as Jobbik once was,
change their appeal in response to a combination of supply- and demand-side
incentives. However, we do not believe that Jobbik has become a moderate party
that has left its nativist agenda behind. On the contrary, we show that nativism
lives on in media channels targeting its core electorate and its fluctuations show
that it is regularly deployed to mobilize its base. Nevertheless, strategic reasons
push the party to rely increasingly on populism at the expense of nativist mobiliza-
tion. While this move came with electoral costs for the party’s popularity (see
Online Appendix B, Figure 3), it was sufficient for it to become accepted as a mem-
ber of a broad opposition coalition targeting Fidesz and thereby helped Jobbik to
overcome its pariah status. One should, however, note that the party has not
(yet) been in government, therefore a definite judgement on the extent to which
it has abandoned its nativist ideas cannot yet be cast.
Overall, we hope the conceptual apparatus and the methodological approach this
article puts forward – namely the study of parties’ programmatic appeal across mul-
tiple platforms and over a long period of time – will provide a helpful resource for
future research that considers additional cases and builds on our arguments.
Supplementary material. To view the supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/gov.2021.28.
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Notes
1 As part of the intra-party conflict, a more radical, nativist group left the party and established the Our
Homeland Movement.
2 The authoritarianism dimension defines PRR parties’ attitude towards democracy and governance
(Kriesi 2014; Mudde 2007). Since it is less related to the party’s programmatic appeal, we focus on the
other two dimensions. For a discussion of the authoritarian dimension in the case of Jobbik, see Krekó
and Juhász (2017), Pirro (2015) and Pytlas (2016).
3 The reservoir of non-voters is relatively large: electoral turnout varies, but since 1990 about 30% of the
electorate stayed away from the polls in each parliamentary election.
































































































































4 Due to the party’s ideological moderation, Novák left the party in the aftermath of the 2018 national
election, and with his departure, the unconditional support Kuruc.info had provided to Jobbik also reduced.
5 These are: democracy, political corruption, political authority, national way of life and multiculturalism.
6 We do not conceptualize populism and nativism as mutually exclusive categories. In our approach, a
document can be both populist and nativist, and as Online Appendix A, Figure 1, and Online Appendix B,
Table 1, show, a portion of the documents contain references to both.
7 We exclude Facebook posts below 100 characters since they often only contain a link, video or picture
without a context. Note that this is still a relatively low threshold as the shortest document we include con-
tains only 13 words.
8 Kuruc.info and the press releases go back to February 2006, Alfahír.hu starts in February 2012, the
Facebook page of Vona starts in March 2010, the official Facebook page starts in October 2010.
9 As further evidence we also looked at content-based transformation of nativism and populism. After the
migration crisis, the tone of nativist mobilization changes. Jobbik shifts away from anti-Roma to anti-
migrant mobilization. In terms of populism, there is a steady increase in anti-elitism between 2014 and
2018, while people-centrism stays relatively constant over time. See Online Appendix C.
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